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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
EX REL. KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI II,
in his official capacity as Attorney General
of Virginia,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
) Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH
)
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS,
)
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
)
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
)
in her official capacity,
)
)
Defendant
)
__________________________________________)
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF
SMALL BUSINESS MAJORITY FOUNDATION, INC. AND
THE MAIN STREET ALLIANCE IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This Brief Amici Curiae is filed by Small Business Majority Foundation, Inc., and The
Main Street Alliance, in support of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendant, Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius, on May 24, 2010.
I. INTERESTS OF AMICI
Small Business Majority Foundation, Inc. (“SBMF”) is a national, nonpartisan
organization, founded and run by small business owners across the United States. SBMF is a
District of Columbia non-profit organization exempt from tax as an educational organization
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. SBMF advocates the interests of small
business owners and researches and disseminates policy proposals addressing the special
interests and needs of small businesses. Over the past few years, SBMF has been focused on the

biggest single problem facing small businesses: the skyrocketing cost of health care. The
enactment and successful implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 199, the law that is the subject of this lawsuit, is of paramount
importance to SBMF and the small business owners whose interests SBMF promotes.
The Main Street Alliance (“MSA”), a national network of small business coalitions, is a
program of Northwest Federation of Community Organizations, a Washington State nonprofit
charitable and educational organization exempt from tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code. MSA creates opportunities for small business owners to advocate for themselves
on public policy issues affecting small business owners, their employees and the communities
they serve. MSA’s members have identified the need to make health care reform work for small
businesses as the top priority for the MSA.
These two organizations, SBMF and MSA, bring to the consideration of the issues in this
case the unique perspective of small business owners that is not represented by either of the
parties or the other amici that have, to date, filed briefs addressing the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss.
II. ARGUMENT
Congress’ Commerce Power is at its apex when Congress regulates “economic activity.”
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2005). Few laws will have a more substantial impact on
interstate commerce than the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (the “PPACA”). Congress determined that the PPACA would reverse a
longstanding trend of rapidly increasing health insurance premiums, see PPACA
§§ 1501(a)(2)(B), 10106(a), and ensure that nearly every American is insured. Id. § 10106(a).
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Small businesses will especially benefit from these reforms. Small businesses must pay
10–18 percent more than large firms for the same health policy, Jon Gabel, et al., Generosity And
Adjusted Premiums In Job-Based Insurance: Hawaii Is Up, Wyoming Is Down, 25 Health Affairs
832, 840 (2006). In part for this reason, small businesses are far less likely to offer health
benefits to their workers, and thus are less able to compete for the most talented employees. By
reducing the cost of health insurance, the PPACA will not only enable small employers that
currently offer health benefits to reduce this rapidly-growing expense, it will also enable more
such companies to provide health benefits in the first place—thus enhancing their power to
compete with larger companies. Additionally, by ensuring that nearly every worker will carry
insurance, the PPACA increases small business productivity by reducing the amount of
employee time lost to serious illness or injury.
The beneficial effects of the PPACA on small business will have an enormously positive
effect on the U.S. economy as a whole. Small businesses represent 99.7 percent of all employer
firms; pay 44 percent of the total U.S. private payroll; and have generated 64 percent of all net
new jobs over the past fifteen years. U.S. Small Business Administration, FAQ’s: Frequently
Asked Questions: Advocacy Small Business Statistics and Research, available at
http://web.sba.gov//faqs/faqindex.cfm?areaID=24.
The provisions of the PPACA requiring all individuals to carry a minimum level of
insurance or pay a penalty, PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(G), are an essential element of the PPACA’s
scheme to lower premiums and ensure near-universal coverage, benefiting small businesses. As
explained below, these provisions are well within Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.
Accordingly, this Court should uphold the minimum coverage provision.
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A. SMALL BUSINESSES WILL PARTICULARLY BENEFIT FROM THE
MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION’S SUBSTANTIAL POSITIVE
EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Congress determined that administrative costs for private health insurance were $90
billion in 2006. PPACA § 10106(a). These administrative costs are particularly difficult to bear
for small businesses which lack the economies of scale that benefit larger employers. Similarly,
by virtue of their small size, small employers lack the bargaining power that major employers
enjoy when negotiating health insurance premiums. As a result, small employers pay an average
of 10 to 18 percent more to provide the same level of health benefits as a large employer. Gabel,
supra, at 840.
The minimum coverage provision will mitigate small business’ competitive disadvantage
in two ways. First, by reducing the cost of insurance, the minimum coverage provision will
enable more small businesses to offer health benefits, thus increasing their ability to compete in
the job market with large employers. Between 2000 and 2009, the number of firms with less
than 200 employees that offer health benefits declined from 57 percent to 46 percent. Kaiser
Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits: 2009 Annual Survey 50 (2009), available at
http://ehbs.kff.org/. Those small employers that do offer coverage often cannot afford to provide
the same level of coverage to their employees. Forty-eight percent of small business employees
have insurance that caps the total amount of care they may receive, as compared with 37 percent
of large firm employees. Michelle M. Doty, et al., Out of Options: Why So Many Workers in
Small Businesses Lack Affordable Health Insurance, and How Health Care Reform Can Help, 67
The Commonwealth Fund, available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2009/Sep/Out-of-
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Options.aspx (Sep. 9, 2007). Similarly, small business employees are three times as likely to
have a plan with no prescription drug coverage, as compared to large firms. Id.
This gap between the coverage offered by large employers and the coverage offered by
small firms leads to a phenomenon known as “job lock.” Employees of companies that offer
insurance are reluctant to leave jobs that provide health care for jobs that do not, even if the new
job could better harness that employee’s particular skills. See Brigitte C. Madrian, Health
Insurance and Job Mobility: Is There Evidence of Job-Lock?, 109 Q. J. of Econ. 27, 43 (1994)
(determining that job lock “accounts for a 25–30 percent reduction in [job] mobility”); see also
Kevin T. Stroupe, et al., Chronic Illness and Health Insurance Related-Job Lock, 20 J. of Pol’y
Analysis & Mgmt. 525, 525 (2001) (finding that workers with chronic illnesses or a family
member with chronic illness are 40 percent less likely to voluntarily leave a job which provides
health benefits than a similarly-situated healthy worker with a healthy family).
“Job lock” causes harm beyond trapping workers in jobs they may not want. It also keeps
small employers who cannot afford to offer good health benefits to their workers from hiring the
most hard working and talented staff. By reducing premiums, the minimum coverage provision
will enable more small businesses to offer health insurance to their employees, thus empowering
them better to compete with large businesses for top talent.
Additionally, by requiring nearly every worker to carry insurance, the minimum coverage
provision will increase small business productivity by reducing the amount of worker downtime
attributable to illness or injury. As explained in Part B, infra, uninsured workers are far more
likely to delay coverage until their condition has deteriorated significantly, not only resulting in
higher medical bills, but in more days of lost work. In 2009, the U.S. economy suffered
"between $124 billion and $248 billion in lost productivity . . . due to the almost 52 million
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uninsured Americans who live shorter lives and have poorer health." Peter Harbage & Ben
Furnas, The Cost of Doing Nothing on Health Care, Center for American Progress (May 29,
2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/05/pdf/cost_doing_nothing.pdf
Indeed, according to the Institute of Medicine, “the estimated benefits across society in healthy
years of life gained by providing health insurance coverage are likely greater than the additional
social costs of providing coverage to those who now lack it." Id.
Small businesses suffer disproportionately from this lost productivity. Because of their
small size, such employers lack a "reserve pool" of employees who can fill in for an absent
worker while that worker is out sick or in the hospital. Mark V. Paul, et al., A General Model of
the Impact of Absenteeism on Employers and Employees, 11 Health Econ. 221, 227 (2002).
By achieving near-universal coverage, the minimum coverage provisions will drastically reduce
the tens of billions of dollars in lost productivity costs the U.S. economy suffers every year due
to uninsured workers. Additionally, these provisions will help to close the competitiveness gap
between large employers and those who are less able to compensate for a sick worker, reduce job
lock and enhance small business job creation. It is beyond dispute that the reduction of the
competitiveness gap between large and small businesses has a “substantial effect on interstate
commerce.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.
B. THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION SUBSTANTIALLY
AFFECTS INTERSTATE COMMERCE BY REDUCING PREMIUMS
AND ENSURING THAT NEARLY ALL INDIVIDUALS WILL CARRY
INSURANCE
Congress determined that, absent the PPACA, national health spending would increase
from $2.5 trillion per year to $4.7 trillion by 2019. PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(B). The PPACA,
however, will eventually reduce this rate of growth by 15% to 20%. Business Roundtable,
Health Care Reform: Creating a Sustainable Health Care Marketplace 23 (Nov. 2009),
6

available at
http://www.businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/Hewitt_BRT_Sustainable%20Health%20C
are%20Marketplace_Final.pdf. In this way the PPACA will save consumers and businesses
hundreds of billions of dollars in the process. The minimum coverage provision will contribute
to these savings in three ways.
First, by requiring almost all individuals to carry insurance, Congress determined that the
provision will drastically reduce the $43 billion in uncompensated care hospitals currently
provide to uninsured patients. PPACA § 10106(a). Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, most hospitals must stabilize any person who presents themselves

to an emergency room, even if that person is unable to pay. Moreover, because uninsured
individuals often delay care until their condition has deteriorated significantly, the costs of
treating uninsured patients often exceed the costs of treating the same condition in insured
individuals. Families USA, Health Reform: Help for Americans with Pre-Existing Conditions 9
(2010), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/health-reform/pre-existingconditions.pdf. These costs are then passed on to other consumers, burdening the average family
with $1000 a year in increased premiums. PPACA § 10106(a).
Even if the minimum coverage provision had been enacted as a standalone provision,
rather than as part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, it would reduce the number of
uninsured Americans by 41%, or 21.5 million individuals. RAND Corp., Analysis of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590) 9 (2010), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2010/RAND_RB9514.pdf. “By significantly reducing
the number of the uninsured, the [minimum coverage] provision, together with the other
provisions of the Act, will lower health insurance premiums.” PPACA § 10106(a)
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Second, the minimum coverage provision will reduce premiums by expanding insurance
pools to include younger and healthier members. The purpose of health insurance is to dilute the
impact of an unexpected and expensive illness by spreading the risk of the cost of such illness
across a large number of individuals. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.
205, 211 (1979).

Because insurance plan participants place their premiums into a pool that any

participant can draw upon if they are ill, pools made up of younger, healthier individuals tend to
have lower costs than pools with older, less-healthy individuals—the healthier the average
member of the pool, the lower premiums will be.
Young adults, however, “are disproportionately represented among people who lack
health insurance, accounting for 30 percent of the 46 million uninsured people under age 65,
even though they comprise just 17 percent of the population.” Sara R. Collins & Jennifer L.
Nicholson, Rite of Passage: Young Adults and the Affordable Care Act of 2010, 87 The
Commonwealth Fund (May 2010), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2010/May/1404_
Collins_rite_of_passage_2010_v3.pdf. Likewise, over 60 percent of the uninsured are in
“excellent” or “very good” health. Lisa Dubay & Allison Cook, How Will the Uninsured be
Affected by Health Reform? (Urban Institute August 2009), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411950_uninsured.pdf. Accordingly, those individuals who
are the most likely to contribute more in premiums to an insurance pool than they take out in
benefits are also the least likely to join that pool in the first place. By requiring the
overwhelming majority of these young, healthy individuals to carry insurance, the minimum
coverage provision will reduce premiums by encouraging those individuals who are least likely
to require expensive care to join insurance pools.
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Finally, the minimum coverage provision is essential to ensuring that other provisions of
the PPACA function as they are intended to function. Historically, insurance companies have
prevented uninsured individuals from intentionally delaying the purchase of insurance until they
become ill or injured by denying coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions. Section
1101 of the PPACA, however, forbids insurers from continuing this practice.
Congress determined that, absent a minimum coverage provision, “many individuals
would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care,” thus allowing them to draw
benefits from an insurance pool into which they had not paid. PPACA § 10106(a). Because of
this “adverse selection” problem, in every single state which has required insurers to guarantee
issue to all individuals—without also requiring all individuals to carry insurance—premiums
have increased, in some cases to the point of unsustainability. See Jonathan Gruber, Why We
Need the Individual Mandate, Center for American Progress, April 8, 2010, at 2, available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/individual_mandate.pdf; Len M. Nichols,
State Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far?, 25 J. of Health Politics, Pol’y & L. 175, 189
(2000). By contrast, the Massachusetts health insurance program has been successful—lowering
costs of a nongroup insurance policy by 40 percent from 2006-2009, the period during which
such costs rose nationally by 14 percent—precisely because the Massachusetts system does
include a minimum coverage provision. Jonathan Gruber, Why we need the individual mandate,
Center for American Progress, available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/individual_mandate.pdf.
The minimum coverage provision will reduce premiums, increase insurance coverage and
strengthen the viability of risk pools. All of these actions directly address significant threats to
and problems with the national market for health care. Additionally, the minimum coverage
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provision is necessary to ensure that PPACA's ban on discrimination against individuals with
preexisting conditions does not undermine the viability of the national health insurance market.
“When Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a
national market, it may regulate the entire class.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 15 (internal citation
omitted). Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate individual
decisions and activities that form “part of an ‘economic class of activities that have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.’” United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 16). The purchase of health insurance clearly meets that test. For
these reasons, the minimum coverage provisions of the PPACA are well within Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be granted.

June 17, 2010

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John Hardin Young___________
John Hardin Young, VSB No. 13553
Joseph E. Sandler
Elizabeth F. Getman
SANDLER, REIFF & YOUNG, P.C.
300 M Street, S.E. Suite 1102
Washington, DC 20003
202.479.1111
young@sandlerreiff.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae Small Business Majority
Foundation, Inc. and The Main Street Alliance
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